Police Legitimacy and the Authority of the State by Bottoms, AE & Tankebe, Justice
 1  L  Green ,  The Authority of the State ( Oxford ,  Clarendon Press ,  1990 )  1 . 
 2  HLA  Hart ,  The Concept of Law  3rd edn  edited by L Green ( Oxford ,  Oxford University 
Press ,  2012 )  82ff . 
 3 
 Police Legitimacy and the 
Authority of the State 
 ANTHONY  E BOTTOMS AND  JUSTICE  TANKEBE 
 Leslie Green begins his book on the authority of the state with the following 
observations: 
 All modern states claim authority over their citizens, and that is one thing which 
distinguishes them from bands of robbers.  … [T]he state ’ s authority  … also claims 
to be supreme  … It claims to regulate [people ’ s] most vital interests, and to do 
so with supremacy over all other mechanisms of social control. Sometimes these 
grandiose claims are hollow. In a society undergoing upheaval they cannot be 
made effective and quickly become legal fi ctions. Even when they are effective they 
may be unjustifi ed, for legitimacy is not among the existence conditions for a state. 
However — and here is the real importance of Weber ’ s celebrated argument — a 
belief in its legitimacy tends to increase its stability and effectiveness. It is therefore 
a crucial question in what circumstances, if any, such beliefs are justifi ed. 1 
 In this paragraph may be found three key propositions, each of which is of 
importance for this chapter. They are as follows. 
 First, Green claims that all modern states claim  authority, and that this 
makes them different from  ‘ bands of robbers ’ or (let us say to simplify mat-
ters) from hostage takers. Hostage takers have power over their captives, 
but that power is exercised only by force or threat of force; they do not 
claim more than this. The point of the comparison that Green makes is, pre-
cisely, that modern states do claim something more than this naked power; 
they claim (note the normative language) the  right to rule. Accordingly, in 
the famous distinction drawn by Herbert Hart between the state and a gun-
man, those held in thrall by a gunman/hostage taker feel  obliged to obey 
him, whereas the state ’ s claim to exercise authority, if substantiated, results 
in citizens feeling a sense of  obligation to obey those in power. 2 
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 Second, Green claims that even a state that has claimed authority over its 
citizens, and is maintaining effective government, is not necessarily legiti-
mate, because effectiveness does not in itself guarantee legitimacy. Rather, 
the state will only be legitimate if its claim to authority is  justifi ed. This 
raises, of course, the question of what is meant by  ‘ justifi cation ’ in this con-
text; and that is a point to which we must return. 
 Third, Green draws attention to Max Weber ’ s argument that if citizens 
believe that a state is legitimate, this will increase the state ’ s  ‘ stability and 
effectiveness ’ . 3 Green endorses Weber ’ s view, but Weber ’ s argument has sub-
sequently been criticised as inadequate by David Beetham, 4 in a discussion 
in which the concept of justifi cation plays a pivotal role. This point will also 
require further consideration. 
 We shall pursue some of these theoretical issues about legitimacy and 
justifi cation before turning, in the second section of this chapter, to our 
main empirical focus, namely the public police. The third and fourth sec-
tions then examine aspects of police legitimacy through the lenses provided 
by the theorisation of Bernard Williams (the  ‘ Basic Legitimation Demand ’ ) 5 
and Amartya Sen (the  ‘ impartial spectator ’ ). 6 In the fi nal section, we turn to 
a consideration of how the police might best respond to the public ’ s  ‘ Basic 
Legitimation Demand ’ . 
 I. LEGITIMACY AND JUSTIFICATION 
 To develop some of the issues raised in the introduction, two questions 
are tackled in this section. First, is the justifi cation provided by legitimacy 
empirical or normative ? Second, if legitimacy is (or to the extent that it is) 
empirical, is the test of legitimacy adequately captured by Weber ’ s claim 
about  ‘ beliefs in legitimacy ’ ? 
 A. Empirical or Normative Justifi cation ? 
 As regards the fi rst question, the defi nitions provided by Wilfried Hinsch 
have been infl uential. According to Hinsch, in empirical conceptions of 
legitimacy,  ‘ a norm or an institutional arrangement is legitimate if, as a 
matter of fact, it fi nds the approval of those who are supposed to live in 
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this group ’ . 7 By contrast, in the normative conception, a norm or an institu-
tional arrangement is legitimate if it meets  ‘ objective [normative] criteria of 
legitimacy ’ . 8 Which of these conceptions is to be preferred ? 
 The empirical justifi cation is vulnerable to some obvious criticisms. Sup-
pose that those in power in a given state ( ‘ Dystopia ’ ) propose, in Hinsch ’ s 
language, an  ‘ institutional arrangement ’ whereby members of an unpopular 
ethnic minority group (comprising only 0.01 per cent of the whole popula-
tion) will all be compulsorily deported, against their will, to a barren unin-
habited island owned by Dystopia, simply because the minority group is 
disliked. Suppose also that this proposed policy is overwhelmingly approved 
in a referendum. On the empirical conception of legitimacy, the policy must 
be considered legitimate, since it has secured, in Hinsch ’ s just-quoted for-
mulation,  ‘ the approval of those who are supposed to live in this group ’ . 
On the other hand, the policy is clearly wrong, and indeed offensive, to 
anyone who takes the concept of equal human rights seriously. Accordingly, 
on what Hinsch in the quotation above calls  ‘ objective [normative] criteria 
of legitimacy ’ it is illegitimate because it is morally unjustifi able. 
 This line of thought provides a very real objection to an  exclusively 
empirical conception of legitimacy. However, the objection should not lead 
us too quickly to dismiss the relevance of empirical issues when analysing 
the legitimacy of state power. To see why this is so, it will be helpful to turn 
to Bernard Williams ’ analysis of legitimacy. 
 According to Williams,  ‘ the fi rst political question ’ for any society is 
essentially Hobbesian; it concerns how that society can establish and main-
tain  ‘ order, protection, safety, trust, and the conditions of cooperation ’ . 9 
Williams considers this to be the  fi rst question because an adequate response 
to it is a necessary  ‘ condition for solving, indeed, posing others ’ . 10 That is to 
say, if there is no order, safety, trust or co-operation in a given society (or a 
part of that society), it will not be possible properly to consider issues such 
as the promotion of the health and education of members of its population. 
Moreover, this fi rst question is, in Williams ’ view, a perennial question; in 
specifi c situations, threats to  ‘ order, safety, trust ’ and so on can and do arise, 
often unexpectedly. Thus, in any given society there is no once and for all 
solution to the fi rst question; it needs to be solved  ‘ all the time ’ . 11 
 These thoughts can be developed by reference to Dennis Wrong ’ s analysis 
of social order, in which he postulates that social order always requires both 
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 regularity and  rule. 12 When someone speaks of order (not specifi cally social 
order), she or he  ‘ means regularity, predictability and system as opposed 
to randomness, chance and chaos ’ ; accordingly, in the social world, order 
requires the development of  ‘ regular and recurrent patterns of [social] inter-
action ’ . 13 Such patterns in turn generate a signifi cant level of predictability 
in social life, and thus of stable expectations among citizens. Stable expecta-
tions are very important both for the establishment of trust and for the well-
being of individuals; the social-scientifi c evidence is clear that a degree of 
regularity or routine (leading to expectations of  ‘ how things will be tomor-
row ’ ) is vital to what Anthony Giddens has termed humans ’ sense of  ‘ onto-
logical security ’ . 14 
 To create this sense of stability in groups of any size, it is necessary that cer-
tain people should have greater power than others to shape how the group or 
society will function. This is what Wrong refers to as  rule. 15 Williams is blunt 
in his analysis of one basic feature of  ‘ rule ’ ; it means, he says, that  ‘ one lot of 
people ’ has power over  ‘ another lot of people ’ . 16 Since  ‘ might does not imply 
right ’ (or, more technically,  ‘ power itself does not justify ’ ), this in turn entails 
that some justifi cation for holding power needs to be provided. If power 
is not justifi ed, then the result will be, according to Williams, terror, not a 
truly  political solution; moreover, the power-holders will become part of the 
problem, instead of the solution to the problem. To avoid power-holders 
becoming part of the problem, they accordingly need to develop narratives of 
legitimation:  ‘ something has to be said to explain (to the less empowered, to 
concerned bystanders, to children being educated in this structure, etc) what 
the difference is between the solution and the problem ’ . 17 
 As will be clear from the preceding paragraph, Williams places himself 
fi rmly within what is sometimes called the  ‘ realist ’ camp of political phi-
losophy; indeed, he argues for  ‘ concepts and explanations which are rooted 
in our more local practices, our culture, and our history ’ , 18 and therefore 
 ‘ ring true in the historical context in which they are made ’ . 19 He contrasts 
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realism with what he calls  ‘ political moralism ’ , defi ned as  ‘ views that make 
the moral prior to the political ’ . 20 Williams argues that among the defi cien-
cies of political moralism is a  ‘ universalistic tendency which encourages it 
to inform past societies about their failings ’ , although such judgements are 
 ‘ useless ’ . 21 By contrast, the notion of political legitimacy can sensibly be 
applied to past societies, taking into account the socio-political character of 
those societies: 
 It is a human universal that some people coerce or try to coerce others, and nearly 
a universal that some people live under an order in which some of the coercion 
is intelligible and acceptable. [It can therefore] be an illuminating question  … to 
ask how far, and in what respects, a given society of the past is an example of the 
human capacity for intelligible order, or of the human tendency to unmediated 
coercion. 22 
 In contemporary societies, the judgement of legitimacy must be equally 
contextual. 
 What we acknowledge as legitimate, here and now, is what, here and now, makes 
sense as a legitimation of power as authority; and discussions about whether it 
does make sense will be engaged, fi rst-order discussions using our moral, social, 
interpretive and other concepts. 23 
 It will be noted that  ‘ moral concepts ’ are included within this process; this 
emphasises that Williams ’ rejection of political moralism is a rejection only 
of the  priority of the moral in political discussion, and  ‘ does not deny that 
there can be local applications of moral ideas in politics ’ . 24 
 Taking Williams ’ analysis together with the identifi ed weakness of the 
purely empirical version of legitimacy (see above), it is possible to advocate 
the adoption of a primarily empirical approach to legitimacy that will nev-
ertheless work on a bedrock of inalienable normative (or moral) commit-
ments. A model of this kind will allow us to avoid describing as  ‘ legitimate ’ 
situations (such as the imagined proposal in Dystopia, above) where the 
majority empirical view is morally abhorrent. We shall develop this point 
later in the chapter. 
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 B.  ‘ Belief in Legitimacy ’ or  ‘ Justifi ed by Moral Beliefs ’ ? 
 In the early 1990s, the political sociologist David Beetham developed what 
has now become a classic conceptualisation of legitimacy. 25 As a sociologist, 
Beetham insists that legitimacy must be understood  ‘ in given social contexts 
rather than independent of any particular context ’ . 26 However, he is critical 
of Max Weber ’ s view that when, sociologically, one observes a  ‘ reliable basis 
for a given domination ’ , this is normally supported by a  ‘ belief in [the] legiti-
macy ’ of the domination. 27 Beetham has two principal objections to Weber ’ s 
view. First, he claims that by emphasising beliefs, Weber has ignored certain 
elements of legitimacy that  ‘ are not really to do with beliefs at all ’ , such as 
actions that  confer legitimacy (ie contribute to making power legitimate), 
regardless of the beliefs of the actor; Beetham gives the examples of swear-
ing an oath of allegiance, or voting in an election. 28 This aspect of legitimacy 
can sometimes cause real dilemmas for those who oppose a given political 
regime: for example, within an authoritarian state, if a civil rights organisa-
tion decides to try to challenge a particular law, it knows that the very act of 
using the courts of the state could be read as conferring legitimacy upon it. 
 Second, Beetham argues that Weber  ‘ misrepresents the relationship 
between beliefs and legitimacy ’ . That is because, according to Beetham, 
 ‘ a given power relationship is not legitimate because people believe in its 
legitimacy, but because it can be  justifi ed in terms of their beliefs ’ . 29 He 
agrees that this  ‘ may seem a fi ne distinction ’ , but he regards it as funda-
mental because only the latter formulation properly captures the fact that 
legitimacy, as seen by citizens, is  ‘ an assessment of the degree of congru-
ence, or lack of it, between a given system of power and the beliefs, values 
and expectations that provide its justifi cation ’ . 30 These are subtle points, 
which are perhaps better understood when we realise that the two authors 
are writing from different standpoints. As we shall show more fully later, 
Weber ’ s main concern is whether a given power-holder can secure obedience 
from his/her subjects; and from that point of view, as Leslie Green put it in 
his comment on Weber quoted at the beginning of this chapter, it is true that 
 ‘ belief in [the state ’ s] legitimacy tends to increase its stability and effective-
ness ’ . 31 However, within such a framework, there might be little interest 
in exploring the content of the beliefs in question. By contrast, Beetham 
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is more substantively concerned with the  ‘ beliefs, values and expectations ’ 
of the subjects of a given state, and how these relate to the justifi cation of 
authority offered by power-holders. A main virtue of his approach is there-
fore that it focuses research attention on the justifi cations offered by power-
holders, and how these justifi cations are responded to by citizens; hence, it 
can address more directly the question  ‘ why people acknowledge the legiti-
macy of power at one time or place and not another ’ . 32 As we shall argue 
more fully later in this chapter, to understand such matters will normally 
require close attention to the history and cultural context of a given society. 
 Within this theoretical framework, Beetham goes on to propose that there 
are three components of legitimacy that are universal in form, but which 
vary in their specifi c content in different societies. These are, fi rst, the  legal-
ity of the actions of power-holders; second, the justifi ability of the actions of 
power-holders in terms of the  shared values within that society; and third, 
expressions of  consent by citizens (that is, actions conferring legitimacy). 33 
This threefold conceptualisation has proved very infl uential in criminal jus-
tice-related discussions of legitimacy. 
 II. POLICING AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF STATE AUTHORITY 
 Max Weber famously defi ned the state as a ruling political organisation 
that, within a given territorial area,  ‘ successfully upholds the claim to the 
 monopoly of the  legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its 
order ’ . 34 Others have claimed that the state arose historically as a solution 
to  ‘ the problem of order ’ (which is Bernard Williams ’  ‘ fi rst question ’ — 
see above). 
 Both of these claims have considerable relevance for contemporary police 
services. In modern societies, the public police are the principal non-military 
group authorised to use force, and they also play a fundamental role in help-
ing to resolve Williams ’  ‘ fi rst question ’ (which, it will be recalled, is also a 
perennial question). For example, if a situation of violent disorder develops 
in a city centre, it is the police who will be called upon to deal with it, using 
force if necessary. This is why it has been claimed that the police are  ‘ the 
state made fl esh  … [T]hey are the most direct representatives of the state for 
citizens given their visible, uniformed, 24-hour presence on the streets and 
their crucial involvement in social intervention and law enforcement ’ . 35 It 
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follows that the role of the public police must be an important topic in any 
serious discussion of the authority of the state. 
 We need to note, however, that the police, while themselves part of the 
state, can be and often are held to account by other elected or appointed 
bodies (for example, a parliamentary committee, or a national or regional 
government). This can, importantly, include being held accountable for 
their  failure to provide, for a particular group, an adequate solution to Wil-
liams ’  ‘ fi rst question ’ , namely the establishment of conditions of  ‘ protection, 
safety [and] trust ’ . 36 An example of such a failure, and subsequent calling to 
account, can be seen in the report of an independent inquiry into widespread 
child sex abuse in Rotherham, England. The Inquiry Report, in its Executive 
Summary, commented that  ‘ it is hard to describe the appalling nature of the 
abuse that child victims suffered ’ ; these sufferings included some victims 
being  ‘ raped by multiple perpetrators, traffi cked to other towns and cities 
 … [and being] abducted, beaten and intimidated ’ . 37 The police for the area 
were among those strongly criticised for a very inadequate offi cial response: 
 At an operational level, the Police gave no priority to [child sexual abuse], regard-
ing many child victims with contempt and failing to act on their abuse as a crime 
 … [S]tark evidence came in 2002, 2003 and 2006 with three reports known to the 
Police and the Council which could not have been clearer in their description of 
the situation in Rotherham. The fi rst of these reports was effectively suppressed  … 
The other two reports  … were ignored and no action was taken to deal with the 
issues that were identifi ed in them. 38 
 The importance of policing in relation to issues of public order and public 
protection is both physical and symbolic. One traditional way of assessing 
the relevance of the police ’ s physical presence has been by researching the 
relationship between crime rates and the numbers of police working in an 
area. However, a high-profi le academic review body in the United States (the 
Committee to Review Research on Police Policy and Practices) concluded 
that, despite some evidence from econometric studies that supported the 
existence of such a relationship, in general it is  ‘ diffi cult to draw strong 
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policy conclusions ’ from this type of research, given the number of poten-
tially confounding variables in play. 39 Of course, also, mere numbers are 
a crude criterion, because much depends on what the employed police are 
doing with their time. Thus, the real evidence for the effectiveness of police 
activity lies elsewhere: the same US committee concluded that where the 
police applied  a diverse array of approaches (not simply law enforcement) 
in  a focused way , the research showed moderate to strong evidence of effec-
tiveness in crime reduction. 40 
 Turning to the symbolic effects of policing within social order, a leading 
British police scholar, Martin Innes, has pointed out that in much of the 
criminological literature on the effects of police actions,  ‘ the extent to which 
[the intervention]  … depends upon and pivots around communication has 
been neglected ’ . 41 As an illustration of this point, he describes events in two 
areas where homicides had recently been committed, and the local police 
had followed the standard operating procedure in such circumstances, 
namely to increase the levels of uniformed patrols. There were contrasting 
citizen reactions (respectively positive and negative) in the two areas, and 
the explanation of the difference was straightforward. In the fi rst site, the 
police had  ‘ explained to local residents what was happening, and why they 
would see more police patrolling ’ . By contrast, in the second area there 
was no explicit communication with residents, and they reached the conclu-
sion that with all these police about  ‘ there must be something [bad] going 
on ’ — a perception that created anxiety precisely because it seemed to be a 
signal that the regular normative order was under threat. 42 Thus, the same 
policy had unintentionally generated different normative messages in the 
two areas, with contrasting outcomes; and the contrast well illustrates the 
important symbolic effect that the actions of a police service can have on 
social order and social confi dence. 43 
 In liberal democracies, members of the public know that an important 
function of public police is to protect them; and even in residential areas 
with active criminal subcultures, citizens ’ preference is often for more rather 
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than less police presence. 44 Yet in order to protect, the police must on occa-
sion act coercively against certain individuals, and in some circumstances 
this can raise genuine questions about their legitimacy. Take, for example, 
the police practice of stopping and searching individuals suspected of pos-
sible involvement in crime. It has been said that  ‘ no form of direct gov-
ernment control comes close to these stops in sheer numbers, frequency, 
proportion of the population affected, and, in many instances, the degree 
of coercive intrusion ’ . 45 Research shows that if such stops are conducted in 
very large numbers, and/or disproportionately against a particular minority 
group, and/or in a very aggressive manner, then issues about the legitimacy 
of the police are raised. 46 Such practices, carried out by a front-line state 
authority, therefore communicate  ‘ powerful messages ’ , positive or negative, 
concerning whether the state truly values the  ‘ citizenship and equality ’ of 
those who live under its protection. 47 
 In the context of strategic thinking about policing, at least in Britain, 
issues of this kind have led to the widespread use by police leaders of the 
phrase  ‘ policing by consent ’ . Although this phrase has its diffi culties (see 
later discussion), it is intended to capture the correct insight that the police 
can, in the last resort, only retain full authority and effectiveness with the 
consent of the general population. That is to say, they claim  the right to 
exercise state power , but that claim requires the consent of those whom they 
police if it is not to appear, in Leslie Green ’ s apt word,  ‘ hollow ’ 48 (see the 
introduction to this chapter). 
 III.  ‘ POLICING BY CONSENT ’ AND THE BASIC 
LEGITIMATION DEMAND 
 We can usefully pursue the important question of  ‘ policing by consent ’ by 
returning to the theorisation of Bernard Williams. In his view, as in that 
of Leslie Green, a state is only legitimate if the claimed authority of the 
power-holders has been justifi ed. For Williams, what distinguishes a legiti-
mate from an illegitimate state is that the former meets what he calls the 
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 ‘ Basic Legitimation Demand ’ . 49 This concept connects directly to his earlier 
analysis of  ‘ the fi rst political question ’ (see above), as Geoffrey Hawthorn 
explains: 
 The fi rst question is always with us, and fundamental to all politics. In princi-
ple, and, if there are no scruples, in practice also, putting a stop to disorder is 
not diffi cult. It requires the effective use of state power. But if there are no scru-
ples, the solution will become the problem. Those subject to state power will lose 
their freedom, and worse. They will ask what the nature of state ’ s protection and 
its price are to be, and they will want a reasonable reply. They will make what 
Williams calls a  ‘ Basic Legitimation Demand ’ . 50 
 The terminology is signifi cant here. As we have commented elsewhere, there 
is a distinction between  legitimation , which occurs when  ‘ a ruler seeks to 
make, enhance or cultivate his/her claim to have the right to rule ’ and  legiti-
macy , which is  ‘ an attribution conferred on a power-holder by his or her 
audience(s), acknowledging that he/she [has]  … the right to rule ’ . 51 The 
basic legitimation demand is therefore a demand by subjects that the power-
holder should provide adequate justifi cation of his/her claim to rule. 
 We should note also that, as Williams describes it, the basic legitimation 
demand is a  normative demand by subjects, but he insists that this does not 
make it a version of  ‘ political morality ’ . Political morality claims the prior-
ity of the moral over the political, but the basic legitimation demand does 
not; rather, it  ‘ comes from a conception of what could count as answering 
a demand for justifi cation of coercive power ’ . Such a demand is  ‘ implicit in 
the very idea of a legitimate state, and so is inherent in any politics ’ . 52 
 A. A Legitimation for Every Citizen ? 
 Williams develops his argument about the basic legitimation demand in the 
following way. Suppose that 
 A coerces B and claims that B would be wrong to fi ght back  … By doing this, A 
claims that his actions transcend the conditions of warfare, and this gives rise 
to a demand [by B] for justifi cation of what A does. When A is the state, these 
claims constitute its claim of authority over B. So we have a sense in which the 
[basic legitimation demand] itself requires a legitimation to be given to every 
subject. 53 
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 As noted above, Williams also claims that what political subjects  ‘ acknowl-
edge as legitimate ’ is what  ‘ makes sense [to them] as a legitimation of power 
as authority ’ . 54 These are very interesting arguments, which we need to 
examine with some care. 
 What Williams is addressing in the fi rst part of the above quotation is 
the question of  political authority — an issue which, as Margaret Gilbert has 
noted, has received far less attention from political philosophers than has 
that of political obligation. 55 But authority is not a trivial question, and 
indeed for front-line police offi cers their authority is something that can be 
(and is) regularly put to the test on their working shifts. 56 
 Margaret Gilbert ’ s suggested account of political authority, or the  ‘ basic 
case of one person ’ s standing to issue commands, as opposed to mere imper-
atives, to another ’ is as follows: 
 X has the standing to command Y, subject to conditions C, if and only if X and Y 
are subject to a joint commitment such that, in order to conform to it, Y must do 
what X says, subject to conditions C. For in that case Y owes it to X to do what 
X says, and  it is not clear that there is any other way of bringing that situation 
about . 57 
 Within this formulation, two concepts are of special interest. The fi rst is that 
of  ‘ command ’ , which carries with it the implication that the person giving 
the command has appropriate standing within a system of normatively-gen-
erated authority. As Gilbert notes, this makes the concept of a  ‘ command ’ 
philosophically interesting, whereas  ‘ there is little that needs [philosophical] 
explanation about uttering imperatives, yelling at someone  … and so on ’ . 58 
The second crucial concept is that of a  ‘ joint commitment ’ , which according 
to Gilbert is based on an understanding of the dynamics of social groups: 
 A social group is founded on one or more  joint commitments of the parties. That 
gives the social group a substantial kind of unity, a unity perceived by its members, 
without whose appropriate understandings it cannot be. This particular species of 
perceived unity provides a basis for a range of phenomena that have been associ-
ated with an individual ’ s identifi cation with a group  … It thus accords with much 
that has been thought about social groups  … by social theorists and political 
philosophers. 59 
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has either committed a moving traffi c offence, or has consumed alcohol or drugs. Evidence of 
erratic driving constitutes a suffi cient ground for reasonable suspicion. 
 As Gilbert makes clear, a  ‘ joint commitment ’ does not have to involve an 
actual contract. On that basis, it is reasonable to assume that, at least in 
most contemporary states, there is an implicit  ‘ joint commitment ’ to the 
effect, roughly, that in order to maintain order the community needs a 
functioning police service. Moreover, in most states, while many people are 
aware of the imperfections of their police service, they do not think it is so 
dreadful that they owe no commitment to it. 60 
 In light of Gilbert ’ s analysis, we can usefully return to Williams ’  ‘ A and 
B ’ example (above), and fl esh it out with some imaginary narrative details. 
In a large English city, Alan and Brenda went to school together, and had 
a brief teenage romance before they went to separate universities and lost 
touch. A decade later, Alan is a police offi cer and Brenda, who was always 
interested in politics, has become a prominent young elected member of the 
city council. Late one winter evening, when Alan is on vehicle patrol, he 
notices a car veering substantially over the white line in the middle of the 
road before returning to the correct side. He signals the car to stop, explains 
to the driver why he has stopped her, and orders her to take a breathalyser 
test, only then realising that it is Brenda. He has therefore issued what Gil-
bert calls a  ‘ command ’ to Brenda, and he would claim, if asked, that (in 
Williams ’ words)  ‘ it would be wrong for B to fi ght back ’ . 61 Brenda, who has 
immediately recognised Alan, experiences considerable personal discomfort 
at being given an order by a former boyfriend. However, as a councillor she 
accepts the legitimacy of the police service, and she recognises that Alan has 
given a reasoned justifi cation for ordering a breathalyser test. 62 She real-
ises, therefore, that she cannot reasonably refuse to obey Alan ’ s order. This 
is because Alan, as a police offi cer, has the  standing and the  authority to 
give this order, and this public normative context transcends their personal 
relationship. The case therefore fulfi ls Gilbert ’ s requirement (see above):  ‘ X 
has the standing to command Y, subject to conditions C, if and only if X 
and Y are subject to a joint commitment such that, in order to conform to 
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it, Y must do what X says, subject to conditions C ’ . 63 Williams ’ analysis is 
crucial, however, in insisting that one of the  ‘ conditions C ’ must always be 
that the power-holder is able to respond adequately (as Alan could in this 
case) to a citizen ’ s  ‘ Basic Legitimation Demand ’ — that is, a demand by her 
that the power-holder should offer normatively appropriate reasons why the 
citizen must obey the command. 
 A further important point arises from this discussion. The inclusion within 
Williams ’ analysis of the need for a legitimation to be offered to  every sub-
ject seems to go at least some way towards defusing the standard critique 
of empirical conceptions of legitimacy previously discussed. (Namely, that 
if a majority is content with the legitimacy of the power-holder, then the 
power-holder ’ s legitimacy is assured, even if the power-holder is system-
atically mistreating a minority.) This is because, if legitimation has to be 
offered by the state to every subject, then in places like Dystopia (see above), 
where the state wishes to deport a minority en masse, this policy will need to 
be expressly argued for in normative terms to all members of the minority 
group. Moreover, in a contested decision of this kind, it will be a require-
ment of offering a legitimation to every subject that representatives of the 
state should be willing to listen carefully to the (almost certainly opposing) 
views of those over whom it is planning to exercise coercive control. Since, 
as everyday experience attests, it is easier to make a decision that is unfa-
vourable to a given individual if one does not have to discuss that decision 
with him/her on a face-to-face basis, it follows that Williams ’  ‘ meeting the 
basic legitimation demand ’ principle constitutes, in Hinsch ’ s terms, 64 a par-
tial normative brake within a basically empirical conception of legitimacy. 
However, it is not a complete brake, because the state would still be able 
to take coercive action against the minority (ie, deport them) after it has 
listened carefully to their representations; and on an exclusively empirical 
conception of legitimacy, it could call this action legitimate if it is democrati-
cally approved. 65 
 We began this discussion by referring to the doctrine of  ‘ policing by con-
sent ’ , so we now need to note that there is a subtle yet crucial difference 
between the state  ‘ giving a legitimation to every subject ’ and every subject 
needing to consent to the state ’ s use of power. We can illustrate the differ-
ence by reference to some events in an English high security prison in the 
early 1990s. This prison contained within it a small and dedicated  ‘ Special 
Security Unit ’ (SSU), which was reserved for prisoners deemed to require 
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the very highest levels of security. Prisoners in this unit objected, on grounds 
of privacy, to prison staff patrolling the small exercise yard attached to the 
SSU, and requested them to stop doing so. According to an offi cial report, 
staff acceded to this request, because  ‘ they had not felt welcome ’ in the 
yard. 66 They relied on CCTV instead, but there was a known defi ciency 
in the CCTV ’ s coverage of the yard, and this became highly relevant in a 
subsequent high profi le escape. Clearly, the prisoners had not consented 
to offi cers patrolling the yard, but could such patrolling have been more 
robustly defended as legitimate ? There is little doubt that it could have been, 
provided that the patrolling was being carried out in accordance with nor-
mal professional standards (and there was no suggestion to the contrary). 
The prison staff could offer a reasonable legitimation to each prisoner as to 
why, on security and control grounds, it is necessary to patrol prison exer-
cise yards, 67 and a legitimation along these lines would have fallen squarely 
within the mainstream of shared values in British society. 68 
 This analysis helps us to see that  ‘ policing by consent ’ is in some ways an 
unfortunate phrase — the police do not, for example, need the  ‘ consent ’ of 
organised crime groups when they are policing these groups ’ activities. What 
the phrase is trying to convey is, of course, the notion of  legitimate polic-
ing. In line with Beetham ’ s helpful formulation (see previous discussion), 
the concept of legitimate policing can be rephrased as policing where there 
is  congruence between the system and the practices of policing, on the one 
hand,  and the societal beliefs, values and expectations that provide its justi-
fi cation, on the other. 69 Williams ’ concept of the basic legitimation demand 
then helps us to sharpen that formulation by insisting that the police must 
always be willing to offer justifi cations for their actions ( ‘ the system and the 
practices of policing ’ ) to each citizen with whom they interact. It is a tough 
requirement, but a necessary one. 
 B. Williams and Weber 
 An instructive contrast can be drawn between the approaches to legitimacy 
of Williams and of Weber. Like Williams, Weber claims that all politically-
constituted states seek legitimation, but while for Williams this is a  necessary 
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condition of politics as opposed to terror (see above), for Weber it is an 
empirical observation. ( ‘ Experience shows that in no instance does domi-
nation voluntarily limit itself to the appeal to [citizens ’ ] material or affec-
tual or ideal motives as a basis for its continuance. In addition, every such 
system attempts to establish and to cultivate the belief in its legitimacy. ’ 70 ) 
Yet despite this similarity, the two authors differ crucially in what can be 
described as the  ‘ standpoint ’ of their respective analyses. Williams insists 
that, precisely because it is seeking to exercise justifi ed power, the state 
needs to offer a legitimation justifi cation to each citizen; accordingly, within 
his analysis the standpoint of each citizen is central. By contrast, Weber 
approaches legitimacy primarily from the standpoint of power-holders, and 
their concern with securing assent to their rule. Accordingly, Weber defi nes 
legitimacy as  ‘ the probability that to a relevant degree the appropriate atti-
tudes [ie, acceptance of the validity of the power-holder ’ s claim to be a valid 
authority] will exist, and the corresponding practical conduct [ie, obedience] 
ensues ’ . 71 He elaborates the point by making clear that these  ‘ attitudes ’ and 
the corresponding  ‘ conduct ’ can be motivated by many reasons: 
 Loyalty may be hypocritically simulated  … on purely opportunistic grounds, or 
carried out in practice for reasons of material self-interest . Or people may submit 
from individual weakness and helplessness because there is no acceptable alter-
native . But these considerations are not decisive  … What is important is that 
in a given case the particular claim to legitimacy is to a signifi cant degree  … 
treated as  ‘ valid ’ [and] that this fact confi rms the position of the persons claiming 
authority. 72 
 As the italicised sentence shows, Weber ’ s approach allows for the possibility 
of a stable domination, described as  ‘ legitimate ’ , in which the demands of 
power-holders are obeyed simply because the citizens realise that they are 
powerless and there is no alternative — that is, for what sociologists have 
described as  ‘ fatalistic ’ reasons. 73 
 We have argued elsewhere that Weber ’ s approach is unsatisfactory, 
 ‘ because it leaves the social scientist without any adequate means of distin-
guishing between obeyed legality [ ‘ fatalism ’ ] and truly normative [empiri-
cal] legitimacy ’ . 74 In the context of policing, the difference between his 
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conception and that of Williams can be vital. Imagine an oppressed ethnic 
minority who regularly receive aggressive, coercive and disrespectful polic-
ing, and who resent this. However, they do not protest much, or fi ght back, 
because of what they perceive to be their powerless position. (Sadly, this 
scenario is not very diffi cult to imagine.) According to Weber ’ s defi nition, 
this is legitimate domination, but for Williams it is not because the basic 
legitimation demand is not met. Does this matter in practice (as opposed 
to in academic articles) ? In brief, it does, for two main reasons. First, such 
an ethnic group will not readily provide information to the police, whereas 
if the policing were more in line with the basic legitimation demand, more 
information would probably be supplied. Second, there will probably be a 
signifi cant attitudinal difference between members of a Weber-infl uenced 
and a Williams-infl uenced police service. The former will consider them-
selves legitimate as long as they are obeyed, and not concern themselves too 
much with how citizens regard their policing style. The latter, by contrast, 
will always recognise that they are  ‘ one lot of people ’ who hold signifi cant 
power over  ‘ another lot of people ’ ; that reasons always need to be given 
as to why their power is justifi ed; and that citizens have reason to make 
some  ‘ basic legitimation demands ’ about how members of their police ser-
vice should justify their authority (and therefore how they should behave). 
Accordingly, a Williams- infl uenced police service will be more likely to gen-
erate a managerial strategy that takes seriously the interests of the policed; 
and is easy to see that this is likely to result in better local policing. 
 Although Williams ’ approach is to be preferred to that of Weber, it is 
nevertheless a weakness of his analysis that he does not mention  fatalism. 
Serious consideration of fatalism makes one recognise the falsity of 
Williams ’ view (see above) that if power is not justifi ed the result is always 
terror; another possible result of unjustifi ed power can be a coercive social 
order breeding fatalism. But in conditions of fatalism, other aspects of 
Williams ’ analysis still hold. For example, in fatalism overweening policing 
can very easily become part of the problem of order, not part of the solu-
tion. 75 Moreover, conditions of fatalism are a good example of the general 
point made by Williams that an answer to the fi rst political question is a 
necessary, but not necessarily a suffi cient, condition for a state to achieve 
legitimacy. 76 
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 IV. SUPPLEMENTING THE BASIC LEGITIMATION DEMAND: 
THE ROLE OF THE IMPARTIAL SPECTATOR 
 Throughout his chapter on legitimacy, Williams shows a degree of preoc-
cupation with the relationship between legitimacy and liberalism. This is an 
illuminating discussion, but it also reveals a need to supplement the analysis 
concentrated on the basic legitimation demand. 
 A. The Basic Legitimation Demand and Liberalism 
 Williams summarises his conclusions on liberalism and the basic legitima-
tion demand by saying (in the form of an equation) that,  ‘ very roughly 
speaking ’ ,  ‘ Legitimacy  + Modernity  = Liberalism ’ . 77 
 What does he mean by this ? His thesis is that in contemporary societies, 
the historical conditions that we fi nd ourselves in, together with the con-
cept of the basic legitimation demand,  ‘ permit only a liberal solution; other 
forms of answer are unacceptable ’ . He argues that, at least in part, this is 
because in a post-Enlightenment era  ‘ other supposed legitimations are seen 
to be false and in particular ideological ’ . 78 Williams does not specify what 
these  ‘ other supposed justifi cations ’ are, but they would certainly include, 
for example, the claim that kings have a divine right to rule — a concept 
which those supporting  ‘ modernity ’ spent considerable time and effort in 
contesting in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Williams insists, 
however, that the  ‘ unacceptability ’ of non-liberal solutions arises only from 
contemporary  political conditions, and not because  ‘ some liberal concep-
tion of the person, which delivers the morality of liberalism, is or ought to 
be seen as correct ’ . 79 
 In making these comments, Williams is of course aware that not all con-
temporary states fully endorse the principles of liberal democracy. Hence, we 
fi nd him asking how we should assess a society where there is, apparently, 
widespread acceptance of a theocratic regime, and/or of laws promoting a 
subordinate role for women. It is reasonable, he thinks, in such a context to 
ask whether  ‘ the acceptance of these ideas can  … be plausibly understood as 
an expression of the power relations that are in question ’ — that is, whether 
the dominant group has deliberately inculcated a belief system in order to 
sustain its own domination. 80 He accepts, however, that this might not be 
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the case, and therefore that the widespread acceptance of non-liberal ideas 
in a given society might indeed be genuine. Although he does not make this 
further point, the implication of this argument must be that in principle, and 
despite the current ideological dominance of liberal-democratic ideas, a con-
temporary non-liberal state could be regarded as fulfi lling Beetham ’ s three 
sociological criteria for legitimate government, namely lawfulness, shared 
beliefs and expressions of consent. 81 
 Ultimately, therefore, Williams leaves us with a degree of unresolved ten-
sion in relation to these issues. This tension can also be directly mirrored 
in the world of policing. For example, it is certainly the case that — to an 
increasing extent — police services throughout the world are being expected 
to take account of human rights declarations and conventions, in line with 
Williams ’ contention that  ‘ Legitimacy  + Modernity  = Liberalism ’ . Yet police 
practices that do not conform with human rights standards continue to be 
regularly applied in many states, sometimes with explicit or tacit offi cial 
approval. 82 We have ourselves encountered senior police offi cers in a par-
ticular jurisdiction who were open in their espousal of torture as an appro-
priate tool within police interrogations, and who believed that this practice 
was supported by the population in their state (and was therefore empiri-
cally legitimate, on Hinsch ’ s defi nition). 83 
 The tension described in the previous paragraph undoubtedly raises some 
very diffi cult issues. We believe, however, that some further understanding 
of these issues can be obtained by examining Amartya Sen ’ s approach to the 
concept of justice. 84 
 B. The Test of the Impartial Spectator 
 In July 2009, 13 women, all wearing trousers, were arrested in a Sudanese 
restaurant for the offence of  ‘ disturbing the public order by dressing inde-
cently ’ under the Sudanese criminal code, which is based on Islamic Sharia 
law. Most of the arrestees pleaded guilty, and were promptly fl ogged, each 
receiving 10 lashes. However one woman, a Sudanese journalist called Lubna 
Ahmed al-Hussein, was told that she would not be prosecuted because she 
was working for the United Nations, in a post that carried diplomatic immu-
nity. She then deliberately resigned her UN post in order to be able to stand 
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trial, and she told the BBC that she wanted  ‘ a public fl ogging to make a point 
about the treatment of women in Sudan ’ ; she also sent out 500 invitations 
to various people to come and witness her lashing. However, when she was 
eventually tried, she was sentenced not to a fl ogging but to a fi ne. She refused 
to pay the fi ne on the grounds that this would legitimate the conviction, and 
so she was sent to prison. However, the fi ne was very soon paid on her behalf 
(but against her wishes) by an association of journalists, and she was freed. 85 
 In this case, there was an explicit contestation of the legitimacy of the 
police and prosecutors ’ interpretation of the Sudanese indecency law. In this 
contest, two views of justice were invoked. The fi rst was rooted in Sharia 
law, which claims the allegiance of all Muslims. However, Lubna Ahmed 
Al-Hussein, herself a Muslim, rejected the view that women wearing trou-
sers has anything to do with either indecency or Islamic religion, and made 
it clear that in her view the prosecution was motivated by a worldview 
that inappropriately espoused the discriminatory treatment of women. This 
view, of course, was much closer to liberal assumptions than was the view of 
the Sudanese prosecuting authorities. Not surprisingly, the case quickly gen-
erated international interest, and a fl urry of statements supporting Lubna ’ s 
cause emerged from a variety of liberal-oriented organisations. Rather simi-
lar sequences of events have occurred in subsequent dress-related prosecu-
tions of women in Sudan, and in the press reports of these cases the previous 
experience of Lubna Ahmed Al-Hussein is regularly cited. 86 
 We have told this story as an illustration of the way in which contesta-
tions of legitimacy frequently develop. A state has one set of practices; these 
are challenged as unjust and illegitimate; people within the state, and some-
times outside it, take positions one way or the other; the issue is revisited 
in subsequent cases of a similar nature; citizens ’ views often change as the 
debates develop; sometimes, but by no means always, the law (or a given set 
of institutional practices) is modifi ed. 
 Amartya Sen ’ s theory of justice is rooted in this kind of empirical reality. 
He makes clear at the beginning of his book that his main aim is  ‘ to address 
questions of enhancing justice and removing injustice ’ , and that this makes 
his theory different in signifi cant respects from other  ‘ pre-eminent theories 
of justice in contemporary moral and political philosophy ’ , 87 notably that of 
John Rawls. 88 Two of these differences are of special interest in the  present 
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 2014 )  11 ). In this chapter, we work simply with the concept of the impartial spectator as 
presented by Sen. 
context. First, Sen ’ s focus is on the  ‘ actual lives  … that people are able to 
lead ’ , as well as on the social institutions designed to promote justice. 89 
Second, Sen has no interest in searching for the characteristics of perfectly 
just societies. Instead, his method is comparative. He advocates a reasoned 
comparison of the qualities of justice contained in two or three approaches 
to policy, or to a particular decision. Arising out of this comparison, there 
is then a choice of the option that is the most just in all the circumstances. 90 
 Clearly, Sen ’ s is a  ‘ realist ’ perspective, and in that respect it has much 
in common with the approach of Bernard Williams previously described. 
(Their substantive foci are different — respectively justice and legitimacy —
 but the intellectual approach is similar). That commonality has led us to 
be interested in the possibility that Sen ’ s theorisation might be utilised to 
complement Williams ’ approach to the study of legitimacy. 
 Of particular interest in this regard is Sen ’ s approach to the process of 
comparing policy options — a process in which he places much emphasis on 
both the importance and the complexity of reasoned argument. His discus-
sion is too rich to be easily summarised here, but we want to focus on one 
topic in particular, that of impartiality in decision-making. Here, Sen calls in 
aid the work of Adam Smith in his  Theory of Moral Sentiments : 
 We can never survey our own sentiments and motives, we can never form any 
judgment concerning them; unless we remove ourselves, as it were, from our own 
natural station, and endeavour to view them at a certain distance from us. But we 
can do this in no other way than by endeavouring to view them with the eyes of 
other people, or as other people are likely to view them. 91 
 This is Smith ’ s concept of the  ‘ impartial spectator ’ ; and Sen claims that in 
developing his theory of justice he is drawing upon and  ‘ extending ’ Smith ’ s 
concept. 92 He then draws an instructive contrast between this  methodological 
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device and that used by John Rawls, in which, famously, people decide the 
ideal principles of justice for a hypothetical society when they are behind 
a  ‘ veil of ignorance ’ which prevents them from knowing whether, in that 
society, they will be rich or poor, male or female, healthy or disabled, etc. 93 
The veil of ignorance is, of course, a methodological strategy that encour-
ages impartial judgements; but, as Sen points out, those judgements are 
made by people who will be part of the society once it is established ( ‘ closed 
impartiality ’ ). By contrast, Sen ’ s concept of the impartial spectator explicitly 
allows the views of persons from other societies and cultures to be consid-
ered and weighed as part of the reasoning process ( ‘ open impartiality ’ ). 94 
 It is this feature of Sen ’ s methodological approach that makes it valuable 
in the context of the debate initiated by Bernard Williams, and exempli-
fi ed in the case of Lubna Ahmed Al-Hussein, concerning the relationship 
between legitimacy and liberalism. It seems clear that there are some con-
temporary states, and some contemporary police services, which have suc-
cessfully legitimated themselves while adhering to values other than those 
of mainstream liberal-democratic political theory. In that sense, Williams ’ 
equation ( ‘ Legitimacy  + Modernity  = Liberalism ’ ) is incorrect as a univer-
sal statement. But, as the case of Lubna Al-Hussein vividly demonstrates, 
there remains an important truth in Williams ’ formulation, which is that, 
in contemporary societies,  liberal values are always available as a powerful 
conceptual tool that can be deployed in debates and contestations about 
legitimacy in any society. 
 We would also argue that the concept of the impartial spectator has a 
wider relevance to the themes of this chapter, beyond the debate about liber-
alism, modernity and legitimacy. We highlight two further possible applica-
tions of the concept, one relating to the macro level, and one to the micro. 
The fi rst of these is of particular importance to our overall argument. 
 To discuss the macro-level issue, let us return to a problem previously 
identifi ed, namely the diffi culties that can arise from adopting an exclusively 
empirical approach to the study of legitimacy. At the end of our discussion 
of this topic (see section I.A above), we advocated the adoption of a primar-
ily empirical approach to legitimacy, but we also argued that — to avoid the 
 ‘ Dystopia ’ problem — this approach should be located within a set of inal-
ienable normative commitments. We did not then discuss how this could be 
achieved, but an obvious model is to be found in the entrenchment of the Bill 
of Rights within the constitution of the United States, and of the European 
Convention of Human Rights within the national laws of most European 
countries. A provision of this kind would back up, and give additional sub-
stance to, the partial  ‘ normative brake ’ that we identifi ed above, arising 
Police Legitimacy and State Authority 69
 95  One might think this is improbable, but see Brian Tamanaha ’ s description of how, as an 
American expatriate working as a young lawyer in Micronesia, he discovered that Microne-
sian  ‘ customs and values could hardly have been more different from the legal system and its 
norms ’ , because Micronesian law had been  ‘ transplanted in its entirety from the United States ’ : 
 BZ  Tamanaha ,  A General Jurisprudence of Law and Society ( Oxford ,  Oxford University Press , 
 2001 )  xi . 
 96  Williams, above n 5 at 6. 
 97  Hinsch, above n 7. 
 98  T  Price ,  Understanding Ethical Failures in Leadership ( Cambridge ,  Cambridge University 
Press ,  2006 ) . 
from Williams ’ identifi cation of the need for the state to provide a justifi ed 
legitimation of its uses of power to every citizen. It would provide what 
we described at the end of section I.A (above) as a  ‘ bedrock of inalienable 
normative commitments ’ on which more empirical analyses of legitimacy 
could be built. 
 But suppose there is a state where there is currently no entrenched  ‘ Bill 
of Rights ’ -style commitment, yet its legislature has been persuaded that it 
should adopt a model of this type. How should it go about creating the 
content of the entrenched provisions ? Here, the concept of the impartial 
spectator seems to have much merit as a methodological device — not least 
because this concept explicitly requires its users to look outside their own 
cultural framework. That is not to say, of course, that it will be sensible 
for any given state or cultural group to disregard the accumulated wisdom 
available within that community. 95 Such sources of wisdom should certainly 
be drawn upon, yet they should also be appropriately tested by consider-
ing insights from elsewhere, in a reasoned process of  ‘ open impartiality ’ , as 
advocated by Sen. 
 At a more theoretical level, the complementary insights of Williams ’ basic 
legitimation demand and Sen ’ s impartial spectator can be characterised in 
terms of subjectivity and objectivity. Williams insists that  ‘ the [basic legiti-
mation demand]  … requires a legitimation to be given [by the state] to every 
subject ’ , 96 which implies that each citizen can formulate a basic legitimation 
demand. This inevitably introduces an element of subjectivity and empiri-
cal difference into the dialogues relating to the basic legitimation demand, 
although, as we have seen, an adequate legitimation can be offered without 
requiring the consent of each individual or group. In consequence, Williams ’ 
theorisation of the basic legitimation demand is ultimately, in Hinsch ’ s 
terms, empirical, 97 and to be fully adequate it requires some objective nor-
mative buttressing. Sen ’ s impartial spectator strategy seems a good way of 
providing that normative buttressing. 
 Turning now from the macro to the micro level, the concept of the impar-
tial spectator has, we believe, some practical relevance in relation to the 
(rather too frequent) ethical failures of police leaders. In an important psy-
chological study, Terry Price has argued that the ethical failures of soci-
etal leaders are very often not  volitional but  cognitive . 98  ‘ Volitional ’ ethical 
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 failures, in Price ’ s conceptualisation, occur when someone wilfully chooses 
to act wrongly, usually for reasons of self-interest or personal gain; he or she 
is fully aware that the act is wrong.  ‘ Cognitive ’ ethical failures, by contrast, 
occur when people persuade themselves that the rules do not apply to them, 
or that they are exempt from them, perhaps because they perceive themselves 
to be a  ‘ special person ’ without whom the organisation would struggle, or 
because they think the particular situation requires them to  ‘ bend the pro-
cedural rules ’ a little, in order to achieve an obviously desirable outcome. A 
recent exploratory research study, carried out for the College of Policing in 
England and Wales, has found that among very senior police offi cers investi-
gated for ethical failures,  ‘ cognitive failures ’ very signifi cantly outnumbered 
 ‘ volitional failures ’ . 99 By defi nition, a  ‘ cognitive failure ’ should be open to 
correction by a process of reasoning; and an  ‘ impartial spectator ’ should be 
able to provide that reasoning. Accordingly, it would seem that putting in 
place consultation procedures that could mimic the concept of the impartial 
spectator should reduce ethical failures among senior police offi cers — and 
therefore, probably, improve police legitimacy. 
 From the above discussion, we can reasonably conclude that, in both its 
micro and its macro applications, the concept of the impartial spectator is 
a useful methodological device for state authorities and police services to 
utilise when they think seriously about police legitimacy. 
 V. RESPONDING JUSTIFIABLY TO THE BASIC 
LEGITIMATION DEMAND 
 The principal remaining task of this chapter is to attempt to suggest some 
content for justifi able police responses to the basic legitimation demands of 
those who are policed. We have seen that, according to Williams, citizens 
are entitled to  ‘ ask what the nature of state ’ s protection and its price are to 
be, and they will want a reasonable reply ’ . 100 The challenge is to provide an 
analysis of the kinds of response that will normally satisfy citizens as being 
a justifi able legitimation, while also recognising that such responses might 
well vary in different cultural and political conditions. 
 Aspects of this topic have been of interest to researchers and theorists in 
criminology for the last quarter of a century, albeit not in the context of Wil-
liams ’ theorisation. Given this, we shall fi rst sketch, in broad-brush terms, 
two different theoretical contributions within this literature, as a prelude to 
a more specifi c consideration of the possible content of justifi able responses 
to the basic legitimation demand in relation to policing. 
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 Criminological scholars came late to the serious study of criminal justice 
legitimacy, and the fi rst major text on this subject was Tom Tyler ’ s seminal 
 Why People Obey the Law, published in 1990. 101 This has been followed by 
many other empirical studies and theoretical analyses in the same tradition, 
both by Tyler and by others. Together, these studies have generated a very 
impressive, and mostly consistent, body of knowledge, usually referred to as 
 ‘ procedural justice theory ’ . 102 
 Tyler ’ s initial main interest was in the topic of legal compliance, as the 
title of his 1990 book makes clear. At a time when  ‘ much traditional social 
[science was] built on the assumption that behavior is motivated by rewards 
and punishments in the external environment ’ , 103 Tyler produced strong evi-
dence from survey data of the relevance to compliance of normative factors, 
especially  ‘ procedural justice ’ , which — it was shown — generated attributions 
of legitimacy, leading to compliance. In later analyses, procedural justice was 
perceived to have two distinct but interconnected strands. 104 The fi rst, akin 
to the well-developed administrative law concept of  ‘ natural justice ’ , 105 is 
concerned with issues such as whether, within a contentious incident, a citi-
zen is allowed by a power-holder to express his/her point of view, whether 
the decision-maker acts in a professional manner and appears competent to 
deal with the issues involved, and so on. This strand is termed  the quality 
of decision-making. The second strand, by contrast, is more personal, and 
embraces a set of issues focused upon whether the individual dealt with by 
the authority fi gure has been treated with appropriate dignity and recognition 
as a person. This strand is called  the quality of treatment . Studies show that 
both strands need to be in place if full procedural justice is to be delivered. 
 A further important insight developed by procedural justice theory 
has been the concept of the  ‘ teachable moment ’ . In his original study, 
Tyler commented that when people encounter legal authorities,  ‘ more 
is at stake ’ than the specifi cs of that particular encounter, because  ‘ the 
procedures experienced are viewed as information about the group that 
the authority represents ’ . 106 In other words, if a driver is stopped by 
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 Constable Smith, in her mind she did not simply encounter Constable 
Smith; she encountered  a police offi cer, and she will tend to treat the 
behaviour of Constable Smith as providing information about the police 
service as a whole. Hence, in a later work, Tyler advised that  ‘ every 
encounter that the public have with the police  … should be treated as a 
socialising experience that builds or undermines legitimacy. Each contact 
is a  “ teachable moment ” in which people learn about the law and legal 
authorities ’ . 107 This insight can be linked with Margaret Gilbert ’ s analysis 
of authority and  ‘ standing ’ , as previously described. For Gilbert, it will 
be recalled,  ‘ X has the standing to command Y, subject to conditions C, 
if and only if X and Y are subject to a joint commitment ’ . 108 However, 
if X ’ s colleagues, P and R, last week treated Y very disrespectfully when 
they stopped and searched him, then Y will probably be less inclined to 
believe in any  ‘ joint commitment ’ with the local police service — and so X ’ s 
standing (or political authority) in his encounter with Y will have been 
damaged by the behaviour of P and R. There is indeed empirical evidence 
confi rming that citizens often interpret their encounters with the police in 
light of previous experiences with police offi cers — sometimes including 
experiences in other countries. 109 
 Although it has been dominant, procedural justice research and theory 
has not been the only strand within the study of legitimacy in criminal 
justice contexts. Building on some of this other work, much of which 
has been carried out in prisons, 110 the two authors of this chapter pro-
posed in 2012 that the study of legitimacy in criminal justice contexts 
needed to move  ‘ beyond procedural justice ’ as the  dominant focus of 
scholarly attention, although we fully endorsed the empirical strength and 
the theoretical insights of the procedural justice literature. 111 We utilised 
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Beetham ’ s conceptualisation of the criteria of legitimacy, and especially 
his fi rst two criteria of  lawfulness and  shared values, as a central focus of 
our approach. As regards  shared values , we argued that both procedural 
fairness and distributive fairness could be seen to be important shared 
values in relation to criminal justice legitimacy, at least in many situations. 
Additionally, we agreed with Beetham ’ s view (to be discussed more fully 
shortly) that  ‘ effectiveness ’ is an important shared value when assessing 
state legitimacy. 112 As regards  lawfulness, we were further persuaded by 
Beetham ’ s view that a  ‘ fi rst condition of legitimacy ’ is that, in a state, 
power must be  ‘ acquired and exercised in accordance with established 
rules ’ . 113 Accordingly, we suggested a fourfold conceptualisation of the 
potential components of criminal justice legitimacy, as viewed by those 
subject to state power, namely: procedural justice, distributive justice, 
effectiveness and lawfulness. Two later empirical analyses, based on data 
from England, Ghana and the United States have supported this fourfold 
conceptualisation. 114 
 In the same paper, we also proposed the adoption of an explicitly  dia-
logic conception of legitimacy. We argued that legitimacy is an ongoing 
dialogue, which begins with power-holders making a claim to exercise legiti-
mate authority. Those without power (whom we called  ‘ audiences ’ ) might 
respond to this claim, power-holders might adjust their claims in the light of 
audience responses, and so on. Adoption of this view requires one to be alert 
to the legitimations offered by power-holders, the attributions of legitimacy 
(or otherwise) made by audiences, and the interactive relationship between 
them. We were not aware, when we wrote that paper, of Bernard Williams ’ 
work on legitimacy, but it will be clear from the discussion in this chapter 
that his valuable concept of the  ‘ Basic Legitimation Demand ’ is wholly con-
gruent with a dialogic view of legitimacy; indeed, it enhances our original 
conception of the  ‘ dialogue ’ by pointing out that audiences may make rea-
sonable demands on power-holders as to the kinds of legitimations that they 
(the power-holders) might justifi ably offer within the dialogue. A further 
important feature of the dialogic metaphor is that a single power-holder 
may need to address several different audiences (the rich and the poor; dif-
ferent ethnic groups; etc); also, audiences may make a signifi cant differen-
tiation in their assessments of the legitimacy of different power-holders (for 
example, within the police service, the local neighbourhood police and the 
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specialist drugs squad). 115 Thus, there can be many different dialogues hap-
pening simultaneously. 116 
 In light of this background, what can be said — as regards police legiti-
macy — about the content of justifi able responses to the basic legitimation 
demand ? All modern states have created some version of a public police 
force/service (or forces/services) within their borders, so the basic argument 
providing a legitimation for the existence of a police service is perhaps not 
too diffi cult to make. However, most publics will, rightly, not give their 
police services  carte blanche to act as they wish. We believe that the fourfold 
conceptualisation of  ‘ audience legitimacy ’ that we identifi ed in our 2012 
paper might provide a reasonable description of the main requirements 
that operational policing must usually satisfy if it is to provide a justifi able 
response to the basic legitimation demand, and we shall therefore use this 
framework as the basis for the remaining discussion in this section. We shall 
focus especially on the normative dimensions of each of the four suggested 
requirements, considering why each might be of relevance within realist dis-
cussions in which  ‘ what we acknowledge as legitimate, here and now, is 
what, here and now, makes sense as a legitimation of power as authority ’ ; 
and remembering also that such discussions  ‘ will be engaged, fi rst-order 
discussions using our moral, social, interpretive and other concepts ’ . 117 
Precisely which  ‘ moral, social, interpretive and other concepts ’ will be 
deployed is of course a contingent matter, varying in different specifi c con-
texts, but our suggestion is that there are good normative reasons, supple-
mented by empirical evidence, to support the view that procedural justice, 
distributive justice, effectiveness and lawfulness will often be relevant issues 
in these  ‘ engaged, fi rst-order discussions ’ . 
 One further preliminary comment is necessary. Given that it is not too 
diffi cult to provide a basic justifi cation for the existence of a police ser-
vice, and given also that many citizens have only very limited contact with 
police offi cers, in practice withdrawal of public support will mostly arise 
when the police service in a given state or local area  fails to act in accord-
ance with the public ’ s, or the political elite ’ s, view of how a police service 
should behave. Thus, substituting  ‘ legitimacy ’ for  ‘ justice ’ , there is merit 
in JR Lucas ’ suggestion that  ‘ we should follow the example of Aristotle 118 
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and adopt a  negative approach, discovering what justice is by considering 
on what occasions we protest at injustice or unfairness ’ . 119 Following this 
advice, a key question becomes: why do police services tend to lose legiti-
macy if their police offi cers act  unfairly (procedurally or distributively), or 
perform their duties  ineffectively , or  behave unlawfully ? 
 A. Procedural Justice 
 Procedural justice (or procedural fairness) has been discussed above, and 
can be defi ned as  the fairness of the processes employed to reach specifi c 
outcomes or decisions ; it includes both the  quality of decision-making and 
the  quality of treatment . There is no doubt about its empirical importance in 
relation to police legitimacy; indeed, a powerful conclusion from the exist-
ing empirical research is that, when they make overall normative judge-
ments about policing, citizens often prioritise procedural fairness (how they 
are treated) over the perceived favourability or fairness of the outcome of 
their encounter with the police. 120 
 Given the normative focus of this chapter, we need to ask why proce-
dural justice appears to be so empirically important ? The most plausible 
answer is, stated simply, that  when police actions demonstrate a recognition 
of an individual ’ s rights ( ‘ quality of decision-making ’ ) and  his/her humanity 
( ‘ quality of treatment ’ ), then  that individual feels valued. This answer was 
fi rst proposed by Lind and Tyler in 1988, and they named it the  ‘ group value 
model ’ . 121 Tyler later explained it in the following way in relation to one 
aspect of the  ‘ quality of decision-making ’ (willingness to listen): 
 People value their participation in organizations and the opportunities that it pro-
vides to affi rm their status within the group  … The willingness of the authority to 
listen to them and consider their arguments is a recognition of their social stand-
ing. If people are not allowed to express their views, they are being denied signs 
of their standing within the group, as well as opportunities for interaction with 
authorities that lead to positive beliefs about membership in the group. 122 
 Tyler went on to argue that similar issues apply in relation to  ‘ quality of 
treatment ’ , where, for example, when  ‘ the police harass members of minor-
ity groups [or] the poor  … they are communicating to those groups that 
they have marginal  … status ’ within society. 123 
76 Anthony E Bottoms and Justice Tankebe
 124  A  Honneth ,  The Struggle for Recognition :  The Moral Grammar of Social Confl icts , 
translated by J Anderson ( Cambridge ,  Polity Press ,  1995 ) . 
 125  However, Honneth ’ s concepts of recognition and misrecognition were identifi ed as  ‘ core 
themes in the analysis ’ in Liebling et al ’ s ethnographic study of the regime of a high security 
prison in England:  A  Liebling ,  H  Arnold and  C  Straub ,  An Exploration of Staff-Prisoner Rela-
tionships at HMP Whitemoor: 12 Years On ( London ,  Ministry of Justice ,  2011 ) . 
 126  CF  Zurn ,  Axel Honneth: A Critical Theory of the Social ( Cambridge ,  Polity Press ,  2015 ) 
 24, 28 . 
 127  Ibid at 28. 
 128  Ibid at 34, 39 – 40. 
 Interestingly, the group value model seems to have some potential links to 
Axel Honneth ’ s philosophical work on the  ‘ recognition ’ of individuals, 124 
although as far as we know these links have not yet been explored in the lit-
erature on procedural justice. 125 As Christopher Zurn explains, Honneth ’ s 
 ‘ moral and social theories are founded upon the thesis that personhood is 
essentially constituted intersubjectively ’ ; and from this base, Honneth pos-
tulates that there are  ‘ three forms of intersubjective recognition — love, legal 
relations and solidarity ’ — that are vital for healthy human development. 126 
These three forms of recognition in turn correspond  ‘ to three forms of prac-
tical self-understanding ’ by the individual subject, namely  ‘ self-confi dence, 
self-respect and self-esteem ’ . 127 In the present context, it is the second and 
third of these forms of recognition that are of particular interest. Respec-
tively, these can be summarised as follows: 
 [For Honneth] individuals gain a sense of self-respect only through the individual 
rights that are granted to members of a legal community  … When acknowledged 
as bearers of legal rights by the other members of their community through their 
legal status, individuals are able to gain a sense of self-respect, a sense of their 
inherent dignity as free and equal among others. 
 Persons  … are positively recognized through the social esteem expressed in soli-
daristic relations with others  … [E]steem relations extend as far as those who 
share the same substantive ethical values concerning what is socially worthy  … 
(what Honneth calls  ‘ communities of value ’ )  … the paradigmatic form of disre-
spect [for esteem relations is] cultural denigration and insult to ways of life. 128 
 These potential links between Honneth ’ s conceptualisation and procedural 
justice theory clearly require more detailed examination, but the resonances 
are intriguing. 
 B. Distributive Justice 
 In a memorable passage, Dennis Wrong has claimed that 
 the problem of order is a  … transhistorical problem rooted in inescapable confl ict 
between the interests and desires of individuals and the requirements of society: to 
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wit, the pacifi cation of violent strife  … and the secure establishment of coopera-
tive social relations making possible the pursuit of collective goals. 129 
 This  ‘ inescapable confl ict ’ between individual desires and the needs of the 
collectivity inevitably leads to debates (or worse) about how various goods 
and services are to be distributed within the collectivity. Such debates can 
be readily seen in action by watching any group of children at play. Accord-
ingly, it is no surprise that the concept of  ‘ distributive justice ’ can be traced 
back historically as far as Aristotle, who defi ned it as  ‘ manifested in dis-
tributions of honour or money or the other things that fall to be divided 
among those who have a share in the constitution ’ . 130 
 In the context of criminal justice, the outcomes of cases are one manifes-
tation of distributive justice or injustice. We have noted above the common 
fi nding, in the general population surveys reported in the procedural jus-
tice literature, that how people are treated in their encounters with offi cials 
(procedures) seems to shape overall judgements of legitimacy more than the 
outcome of the encounter. However, this kind of result is not replicated in 
all contexts. One reason for this is that, as Tyler himself noted in his original 
publication, in surveys of the general population citizens might well  ‘ lack 
the information to judge consistency ’ of outcomes. 131 Also, of course, the 
more signifi cant the outcome for the individual ’ s life, the more likely it is to 
affect his/her judgements of legitimacy. Accordingly, Sparks and colleagues 
found in their study of high security prisons (where sanctions can have rela-
tively severe consequences, and  ‘ news travels specially fast [so] people know 
about one another ’ s outcomes as well as about procedure ’ ) that consistency 
of outcomes as well as procedural justice was empirically important for 
legitimacy. 132 Similarly, in a recent study of sentencing in an English Crown 
Court, the authors commented that their fi ndings supported the hypotheses 
of procedural justice theory; however, it was also the case that  ‘ in the stark 
setting of the courtroom, the outcome of a case  … is a crucial determinant 
of court users ’ perceptions of legitimacy ’ . 133 
 But in any case, the study of outcomes in individual cases is not the only 
issue of relevance when considering distributive justice. Take, for example, 
the imaginary case of Courtney, a young black student born in England, who 
lives in an area of London with a relatively high ethnic minority population. 
From his studies, he is aware of the offi cial statistics showing that, as at 
March 2015, blacks in England and Wales were four times more likely than 
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whites to be stopped by police: 134 and he is angry about this. One day he is 
himself stopped by the police. Courtney regards the outcome of his case (no 
further action) as satisfactory and just. However, he is still angry about the 
frequency with which black people are stopped, and this delegitimates the 
police in his eyes. The distributive justice issue that concerns him is, there-
fore, not the outcome of his case, but the perceived over-enforcement of the 
law against an ethnic minority. 
 The perceived excessive use of police powers has often produced resent-
ment among minority communities, sometimes leading to open confrontation 
between police offi cers and members of these communities. A well-known 
English example of this was the riot in Brixton, London, in 1981, sparked 
by a police stop-and-search operation known as Operation Swamp, which 
disproportionately targeted black youths. 135 A more recent and more tragic 
set of examples is to be found in the United States, where there is evidence 
to show that police shootings are disproportionately focused on African 
Americans: for example, in 2015 there were 7.22 killings by police offi c-
ers per million African Americans, compared with 2.94 per million White 
Americans. 136 A notorious case of a black man being shot by a police offi cer 
was the death of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, in August 2014; 
we shall shortly explore more fully the contextual background of policing 
in Ferguson. 
 Distributive injustice can occur because of the under-enforcement, as well 
as the over-enforcement, of laws. According to Natapoff: 
 Underenforcement is a weak state response to lawbreaking as well as to victimiza-
tion. It  … offers important insights into the government ’ s relationship with vulner-
able groups in the context of the criminal system. In practice, underenforcement 
is often linked with offi cial discrimination, increased violence, legal failure, and 
the undemocratic treatment of the poor. Underenforcement can also be a form of 
deprivation, tracking familiar categories of race, gender, class, and political pow-
erlessness. Conceived of as a form of public policy, underenforcement is a crucial 
distribution mechanism whereby the social good of lawfulness can be withheld. 137 
 As Natapoff notes, under-enforcement can involve either a weak response to 
victimisation or a weak response to certain kinds of lawbreaking (in particu-
lar, the failure to pursue lawbreakers who have committed crimes against 
members of disadvantaged groups). Both kinds of under-enforcement have 
occurred in England. The fi rst type is exemplifi ed by the Rotherham child 
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sex abuse scandal, where, it will be recalled, the police in the area  ‘ regard[ed] 
many child victims with contempt ’ and  ‘ gave no priority ’ to this kind of crime, 
despite having been made aware of the scale of the problem through three 
independent reports. 138 As a consequence, those victimised felt desperately 
unsupported. The second type of under-enforcement (under-enforcement 
of lawbreaking) became apparent in the case of Stephen Lawrence, a young 
black man who was murdered in the streets of south London in 1993. 
A prosecution of suspects initially failed to achieve conviction. Stephen 
Lawrence ’ s family complained of police racism which, they claimed, had 
resulted in a failure by the police to take the investigatory process seriously. 
A commission of inquiry confi rmed aspects of the complaints by the family; 
it found that professional incompetence and institutional racism accounted 
for the failure of the police to secure convictions for the murder. 139 
 Not surprisingly, groups who experience either over-enforcement or 
under-enforcement of the law tend to blame the police for what they have 
experienced, so this often leads to a diminution of attributions of legitimacy. 
Accordingly, distributive fairness is an appropriate and necessary element in 
the police ’ s response to the public ’ s basic legitimation demand. 
 C. Effectiveness 
 In an instructive discussion, David Beetham drew attention to a distinction 
sometimes made by political scientists between  ‘ legitimacy ’ (as a normative 
concept) and effectiveness (which they perceive as an instrumental concept). 
At one level, he argues, the distinction is valid, because the two concepts  ‘ are 
not coterminous ’ . But matters are not as simple as this: 
 [T]here is a reciprocal connection between the two [concepts]  … [L]egitimacy 
makes a difference to the effectiveness of a system of power, through the quality 
of performance it secures from those subordinate to it. Equally importantly,  the 
performance of government makes a signifi cant difference to, and forms a neces-
sary component of, its legitimacy  … After all, how can the enormous powers of 
the state be at all justifi ed, or people obliged to obey it, unless it fulfi l require-
ments necessary to the society and their own well being and that it fulfi l them 
effectively ? 140 
 In the sphere of policing, societies may reasonably differ on what the  specifi c 
priorities of the police should be — for example, public order, counter-
terrorism, property crimes, sex offences or whatever. But whichever priori-
ties are chosen, there will be an expectation by the public that the police 
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should be reasonably successful in achieving results; 141 if they are not, 
then — on Beetham ’ s analysis — loss of legitimacy may follow. 
 Extensive research evidence from studies of vigilante violence supports this 
claim, because vigilantism usually arises in contexts where there is ineffective 
state policing. For example, Anderson ’ s work in inner cities in the US found 
that recourse to vigilantism tends to occur in situations where, in a context 
of weak policing, personal concern for one ’ s safety takes over, culminating 
in  ‘ people ’ s law ’ , based on  ‘ street justice ’ . 142 The study also showed that 
even when the police have the capacity to intervene, they may be unwilling 
to respond to people ’ s security needs:  ‘ when called, they may not respond, 
which is one reason many residents feel they must be prepared to take 
extraordinary measures to defend themselves and their loved ones against 
those who are inclined to aggression ’ . 143 Similarly, in Nigeria, a lack of police 
response against violent robberies contributed to the rise of the Bakassi Boys, 
a vigilante group that combined torture with occult forces to fi ght crime. 144 
 This direct evidence from vigilantism studies of the relation between 
police ineffectiveness and low public perceptions of police legitimacy has 
been interestingly supplemented by survey research in South Africa. South 
Africa has a high crime rate (in 2011, 50 murders and 100 recorded rapes 
a day among a population of 50 million), and the purpose of the survey 
was to test whether, in such a context, procedural justice would feature as 
prominently as a predictor of legitimacy as it has done in European and 
North American surveys. The answer was that procedural justice remained 
important, but was trumped, in these conditions, by effectiveness: 
 We fi nd that trust in both police procedural justice and effi cacy is correlated to 
police legitimacy  … Yet procedural justice is a less important predictor of legiti-
macy than in [Anglo-American Democratic Policing] countries, while effectiveness 
appears to be a stronger predictor of legitimacy than studies conducted in those 
countries usually fi nd  … In South Africa  … while fairness is important, effective-
ness appears to be more so. 145 
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 Accordingly, far from being unconnected to legitimacy, police effectiveness 
can be read as a key measure of the extent to which authorities are able to 
solve Williams ’  ‘ fi rst political question ’ . As Mulgan notes, this may have 
consequences well beyond criminal justice: 
 [O]rder and safety are essential not just for life to carry on but also for people to 
live well. The available data suggest that political stability and order, the rule of 
law and justice, are decisive to happiness  … It is hard to overestimate the value of 
strong, stable and protective and legitimate governance to human well-being. 146 
 Mulgan ’ s reference to  ‘ protective and legitimate governance ’ raises a further 
important issue; namely, a possible contrast between the  ‘ protection ’ offered 
by public police (that is, by the state) and that offered by vigilante groups 
or mafi as. 147 As Ian Loader has argued, some demands for protection are 
concerned simply with the prevention of immediate threat, but true security 
has to go beyond this: 
 Security inheres, rather, in the capacity of individuals and groups to feel at ease 
with the threats that their environment poses, such that they do not, on an every-
day basis, have to think about how safe they are, or routinely concern themselves 
with the effectiveness of the security measures that are in place, or constantly be 
bothered with whether and how these may need to be bolstered. To be secure, as 
opposed to simply safe, is to be comfortable in, and with, one ’ s environment and 
hence free from the burdens of recurring security work. 148 
 This conceptualisation helps us to differentiate the role of state policing and 
the protective activities of organised gangs and similar groups. The state 
works within the boundaries of normative requirements in which public 
security is  ‘ a right available, by reason of their membership alone, to all 
members of that community ’ . 149 Organised criminal gangs, mafi as, or vigi-
lante groups do provide protection, but always partially, and sometimes in 
a manner that poses a threat to the safety of others, and/or without rec-
ognition of notions of justice and accountability. 150 The provision of truly 
effective security is therefore, in principle, very much an element in the 
appropriate state response to citizens ’ basic legitimation demands. 151 
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 D. Lawfulness, or Rule-governed Power 
 In Beetham ’ s frequently-reproduced diagram setting out  ‘ the three dimen-
sions of legitimacy ’ , the fi rst of the three  ‘ criteria of legitimacy ’ is described 
as  ‘ conformity to rules (legal validity) ’ . 152 However, later in the same text, 
in Beetham ’ s fuller description of this criterion, matters become a little more 
nuanced. Here, it is said that the  ‘ fi rst condition ’ of the legitimacy of any 
form of social power is that the power  ‘ should be acquired and exercised 
in accordance with established rules ’ . 153 This gives a wider remit to the 
criterion, because the  ‘ rules ’ are described as being  ‘ either customary and 
conventional in form,  or  … part of a legal order ’ . 154 Of course, in modern 
states the rules are very often formally legal, but  ‘ even in the contemporary 
world the force of convention still exists ’ . 155 
 Both formal legality and informal conventions are therefore relevant to 
this component of legitimation and legitimacy. Police offi cers often and 
rightly appeal to formal legal provisions as the basis for their actions, espe-
cially when they make coercive and potentially controversial interventions 
in people ’ s lives — such as stop and search, arrest, interrogation, communi-
cations intercepts, and (in exceptional circumstances) the shooting of a sus-
pect. But, as Beetham points out, if people in power appeal to the law as the 
justifi catory legitimation for their coercive actions, it follows that they must 
also  ‘ respect [the law] themselves for their legitimacy to be sustained ’ . 156 
More generally (and now embracing conventions as well as formal law),  ‘ it 
follows from the nature of social rules that in any rule-governed social order 
the existence and acquisition of power cannot be separated from the norma-
tive expectations  … by reference to which its possession is justifi ed ’ . 157 
 This set of ideas in turn explains the importance of the concept of the 
 ‘ rule of law ’ , described by Beetham as (among other things) embracing the 
view that  ‘ the powerful and their agents, whatever infl uence they may exer-
cise over the formulation of the law, are themselves subject to it and have 
to conform to recognised procedures if they wish to change it ’ . 158 The rule 
of law has been described by the American legal theorist Brian Tamanaha 
as  ‘ the dominant legitimating slogan of law at the close of the twentieth 
century ’ . 159 At its heart are principles of due process and equality, and an 
expectation that those who enforce the law, including the police, must do so 
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in a manner that is  ‘ unbiased, free of passion, prejudice, and arbitrariness, 
loyal to the law alone ’ . 160 When these principles are followed, there is of 
course an overlap between lawfulness, procedural justice and distributive 
justice. 
 Unfortunately, however, the police do not always behave in accordance 
with formal legal requirements, nor with informal conventions as to how 
law enforcement offi cials should behave. 161 Such actions can cause (and 
historically have caused) deep disquiet and a withdrawal of confi dence in 
the police in certain communities, especially underprivileged and/or minor-
ity communities, as is illustrated by the investigation by the US Department 
of Justice into the police department in Ferguson, Missouri, after the shoot-
ing of Michael Brown (an incident we have already alluded to above). The 
Table of Contents at the beginning of the report of this investigation is itself 
a damning indictment of the Ferguson Police Department (FPD), as the 
following extracts show: 
 —  FPD Engages in a Pattern of Unconstitutional Stops and Arrests in Vio-
lation of the Fourth Amendment [of the US Constitution]; 
 —  FPD Engages in a Pattern of Excessive Force in Violation of the Fourth 
Amendment [of the US Constitution]; 
 —  Ferguson Law Enforcement Practices Disproportionately Harm Fergu-
son ’ s African-American Residents and Are Driven in Part by Racial 
Bias; 
 —  Ferguson ’ s Law Enforcement Practices Erode Community Trust, Espe-
cially Among Ferguson ’ s African-American Residents. 162 
 The report also shows that these key points are interconnected: 
 Our investigation showed that the disconnect and distrust between much of Fer-
guson ’ s African-American community and FPD is caused largely by years of the 
unlawful and unfair law enforcement practices by Ferguson ’ s police department 
 … We heard from African-American residents who told us of Ferguson ’ s  ‘ long 
history of targeting blacks for harassment and degrading treatment ’ and who 
described the steps they take to avoid this — from taking routes to work that skirt 
Ferguson to moving out of state. An African-American minister of a church in a 
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nearby community told us that he doesn ’ t allow his two sons to drive through 
Ferguson out of  ‘ fear that they will be targeted for arrest ’ . 163 
 It is worth emphasising that these practices had developed within a coun-
try that is rightly proud of its liberal-democratic traditions, and that has 
enshrined within its constitution a strong Bill of Rights. The stark contrast 
between the constitutional rhetoric and the actual practices of policing in 
Ferguson emphasises the need for strong accountability structures for polic-
ing within liberal-democratic states. 
 Of course, police unlawfulness is not always as systematic as it appar-
ently was in Ferguson. For example, on specifi c occasions a group of offi cers 
might be tempted to engage in what has come to be known, rather unfor-
tunately, as  ‘ noble cause corruption ’ — that is, the use by the police of  ‘ illicit 
means for organisationally and socially approved ends ’ . 164 Thus, in a high 
profi le case, securing conviction of an  ‘ obviously ’ guilty person might seem 
to investigating offi cers to be an act that is clearly in line with the police ’ s 
mission, and one that will be approved of by the general population. So if 
the evidence does not seem quite suffi cient to achieve a conviction, there 
might be a temptation to improve it — by, for example, planting or falsifying 
some evidence, or engaging in unlawful practices of interrogation in order 
to secure a confession. 165 This is a form of  ‘ cognitive ethical failure ’ , as 
previously described; 166 but while it might appear to have social benefi ts, 
it can also lead to delegitimation if and when the illegality is discovered —
 especially if the suspected person is convicted, but then found to be inno-
cent, as has happened in some high profi le cases. 
 E. Realism and the  ‘ Basic Legitimation Demand ’ 
 We have suggested that the four issues we have identifi ed (procedural jus-
tice, distributive justice, effectiveness and lawfulness) are matters that will 
very often, and quite naturally, be raised within empirically realist discus-
sions of  ‘ what, here and now, makes sense as a legitimation of power ’ . 167 
We do not, of course, claim that all four of them will be raised within every 
legitimation discussion, because real-world debates do not work like that. 
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Rather, as we have previously suggested, such debates occur especially when 
there are legitimacy defi cits, and they are often heavily infl uenced by the his-
tory and culture of the local situation. Thus, there is much that is contingent 
about legitimacy debates. Bearing that in mind, our claims are fi rst, that the 
four issues we have identifi ed are, empirically speaking, not infrequently 
raised in legitimation discussions; and second, that there are good norma-
tive reasons, relating to the concept of justifi ed political authority, why they 
are regularly raised. 
 The four issues must, however, always be seen as potentially operating in 
interaction with one another; and they will not always work in harmony. In 
particular, there can be tensions between effectiveness and each of the other 
three matters. The potential tension with lawfulness has been discussed 
above, but effectiveness can sometimes also seem to confl ict with distribu-
tive justice (as where a type of crime appears to be committed particularly 
frequently by a given ethnic group) and with procedural justice (as where, 
in the wake of terrorist incidents, offi cers want to concentrate on preventive 
actions, and so wish to pay less attention to treating everyone with human-
ity). In dealing with such tensions and confl icts, we suggest that Amartya 
Sen ’ s  ‘ impartial spectator test ’ will be a valuable resource, and will help 
police services to focus on longer-term social consequences, as well as on 
the immediate situation. 
 There is also a further point of some theoretical importance that arises 
from the analysis in this section. Diarmaid Harkin has insightfully pointed 
out that while there is a general consensus in the academic literature on 
policing that  ‘ legitimacy is undermined by corruption, brutality and dishon-
esty ’ , nevertheless, when examples of such behaviour come to light, they 
 ‘ are rarely  catastrophic for the police, but contained in their impact ’ . 168 
As a possible explanation of this phenomenon, Harkin draws attention to 
the potential relevance of John Jost ’ s psychological  ‘ system justifi cation the-
ory ’ , according to which there is  ‘ a general ideological motive to justify the 
existing social order ’ ; 169 but there are at least two other possible, and more 
sociological, explanations. One would rely on Margaret Gilbert ’ s concept 
of a  ‘ joint commitment ’ , 170 and the argument would be that many aspects 
of such a commitment can survive even some major shocks. The second 
possibility would draw attention to the fact that legitimation and legitimacy 
are always political issues, and have to be viewed within the context of the 
particular political system in which they occur. 
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 This second possibility is well illustrated by some events in the Repub-
lic of Ireland, as described by Vicky Conway (not cited by Harkin). 171 In 
County Donegal, a disturbing series of allegations about the police emerged 
from 1996 onwards; these were eventually considered by a tribunal presided 
over by a High Court judge (Justice Morris), which sat for six years from 
2002, and issued eight reports. The fi ndings of the tribunal were  ‘ exception-
ally critical ’ of the police, documenting  ‘ corruption, abuse of power and 
negligence from management ’ , as well as  ‘ a disregard for procedure at every 
turn and a belief that this could be done with impunity ’ . 172 Yet despite all 
this, a national survey of public confi dence in the police showed only a small 
change from 2002 to 2008 (86 per cent satisfi ed or very satisfi ed in 2002; 81 
per cent in 2008); and among the 26 counties in the Irish Republic, respond-
ents in Donegal recorded the second highest level of confi dence. 173 Conway 
suggests some reasons for these striking fi ndings, based on Ireland ’ s com-
plex post-colonial history, and the ideological importance of the Irish  gardai 
(police) within that history. The details of her discussion need not concern 
us here, but we do need to note the importance of the historical dimen-
sion in this example, because — as previously noted — how people judge the 
police in a particular situation very often depends upon prior experiences 
and understandings. 174 
 Yet given the dialogic nature of legitimacy, and the existence of multiple 
dialogues (see above), the lack of impact  on the general public of events 
such as those in Donegal might not be the only relevant issue. For example, 
studies in political science have shown that when a political leader loses 
the confi dence (legitimacy) previously placed in him or her by elites close 
to the sources of power, this can be fatal for his/her effective continuance 
in offi ce. 175 Thus, in the policing context, not only public perceptions, but 
also the state ’ s more formal mechanisms of accountability in relation to 
the policing function are a vital element in the total set of dialogues about 
legitimacy. 176 In other words — and unsurprisingly — a realist political analy-
sis of police legitimacy ultimately requires attention to many aspects of state 
functioning. 
 The upshot of the discussion in this section is therefore that procedural 
justice, distributive justice, effectiveness and lawfulness can be empirically 
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identifi ed as important potential contributors to discussions about police 
legitimation and legitimacy. But these matters can sometimes be in tension 
with one another; and, given the historical and contextual contingency of 
legitimacy discussions, in a particular context one or more of them might 
not have the impact that one would normally anticipate. 
 As a fi nal comment, the preceding discussion has assumed that the legiti-
mation discussion is taking place within Williams ’  ‘ realist ’ framework, 
which means that the conception of legitimacy adopted is ultimately empiri-
cal. We have argued above that such a framework, although immensely 
analytically valuable, needs buttressing by some bedrock normative com-
mitments. This is not the place for an extended discussion of what those 
commitments should be, but in brief we would argue that they should be 
based on the concept of human rights, and they would therefore be very 
similar to those contained in the US Bill of Rights or the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights. Provisions of this sort would be suffi cient to deal 
with the example that we have used throughout this chapter of the proposal 
for forced deportation of an ethnic minority in  ‘ Dystopia ’ ; clearly, such a 
proposal would violate such a Bill or Convention. 
 VI. CONCLUSION 
 The analysis in this chapter has, we hope, demonstrated that the legitimacy 
of the public police is, in contemporary states, an issue of central impor-
tance with regard to what Bernard Williams described as  ‘ the fi rst political 
question ’ for any state, namely the establishment and maintenance of  ‘ order, 
protection, safety, trust, and the conditions of co-operation ’ . 177 Our analy-
sis of this issue has drawn upon prior criminological work on police legiti-
macy, but it has also considered two concepts from political philosophy 
not previously discussed within the criminological literature on legitimacy, 
namely Williams ’  ‘ Basic Legitimation Demand ’ and Amartya Sen ’ s  ‘ impar-
tial spectator ’ . 
 Our analysis has been primarily theoretical, but by drawing upon 
the empirical research literatures on both policing in general, and on 
the  legitimacy of the police in particular, it has sought to remain aware of the 
day-to-day realities of policing. Indeed, our hope is that some of the central 
topics discussed here could be of practical assistance to police leaders as 
they seek to deliver just and legitimate policing. These topics include, fi rst 
and foremost, Williams ’ suggestion that there is a need for those, like the 
police, who are invested with state powers to be able to offer a legitimation 
 to every subject as to why the use of those powers is normatively justifi ed. 
88 Anthony E Bottoms and Justice Tankebe
 178  Tyler, above n 107 at 257. 
 179  Williams, above n 5 at 5. 
 180  Conway, above n 171. 
 181  Price, above n 98; Hales et al, above n 99. 
 182  Sen, above n 6. 
Bearing in mind Tom Tyler ’ s concept of the  ‘ teachable moment ’ , 178 we can 
reasonably add that in principle this requirement needs to be met  on every 
occasion that police powers are used. These are stringent requirements, but 
police offi cers need to remember that, in the last resort, they are — as Wil-
liams crudely but correctly put it — simply  ‘ one lot of people ’ who have been 
given power over  ‘ another lot of people ’ ; and, since  ‘ power itself does not 
justify ’ , the justifi cation of police power is in principle continually neces-
sary. 179 Of course, the sociological reality is — as the events dealt with by 
the Morris Tribunal in Ireland particularly demonstrate 180 — that sometimes 
the police can rely on their accumulated public goodwill to retain legitimacy 
even when they have behaved in unjustifi able ways. But legitimacy is a dia-
logic process involving many layers, many players, and an unfolding series 
of events, and it would be an unwise police leader who believes that his or 
her police service can sustain legitimacy indefi nitely in such circumstances. 
Unwise police leaders do, sadly, exist, but their normative failures are more 
often, in Terry Price ’ s language, cognitive rather than volitional; 181 and we 
have suggested that if they were to use Amartya Sen ’ s  ‘ impartial spectator 
test ’ , 182 the number of such failures would be reduced. 
 Police offi cers at all levels are reasonably entitled to ask scholars of polic-
ing whether their research and theorisation can offer any practical guidance 
as to how police legitimacy can be developed and sustained. As we have 
shown, legitimacy dialogues are always contingent on specifi c features of 
the place and time in which they occur, and are infl uenced by the history and 
culture of that place and time; and this means that the specifi cs of legitima-
tion and legitimacy can be very variable. We have however suggested the 
enduring importance of procedural justice, distributive justice, effectiveness 
and lawfulness as guides to the delivery of legitimate policing. Perhaps the 
best way to describe their potential importance as a practical guide is to say, 
fi rst, that fi rm evidence can be cited that a failure to deliver any one of these 
four matters has on some occasions led to a legitimacy defi cit for a public 
police service; but second, there are no reports of a police service that has 
delivered all four of them, and has lost its legitimacy. 
